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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This literature review was requested by the 
WHO/EHA to examine current knowledge 
about health policy formulation in post-
conflict countries and complex political 
emergencies.  According to the literature 
reviewed, health policy formulation in 
post-conflict countries and complex 
political emergencies has been successful 
in providing useful direction to health 
service providers, and channelling donor 
resources in a more effective manner.  
Based on this success, there may be scope 
to expand health policy formulation and 
implementation in both post-conflict 
countries and complex political 
emergencies to address the fragmented, 
and often sub-effective provision of health 
services found in these countries.  
 
During a complex political emergency, 
health systems are often severely 
compromised, and health policy 
formulation is disrupted.  Health needs 
increase, along with morbidity and 
mortality rates, and humanitarian actors 
often enter the arena to provide essential 
services that the government is no longer 
willing or able to provide.  Although some 
inter-agency co-ordination takes place, it is 
rare that a joint health policy and strategy 
framework is developed to guide the 
various agencies in their activities. This 
lack of policy frequently leads to a 
patchwork of activities, with different 
agencies using different strategies and 
health care models.  In addition, health 
authorities do not have the capacity to 
monitor and guide the various activities, 
nor is there a single agency with the tools, 
resources and authority to take up this role.  
It is suggested that this lack of co-
ordination and policy vision lead to 
inefficient use of limited human and 
financial resources, and results in less 
effective health services and increased 
morbidity and mortality. 
 
In order to alleviate these problems, 
numerous authors have suggested 
supporting the health policy formulation 
process and the creation of health policy 
frameworks.  This can be done via aid 
coordination mechanisms such as sector-
wide approaches, performance-based 
partnership agreements, and consolidated 
appeals processes.  Some countries have 
created country-specific mechanisms that 
focus on the creation of health policy 
frameworks. 
 
Policy frameworks can be described as 
systemic, where basic objectives or 
principles of the health system are decided, 
and programmatic, where intervention 
priorities are set and translated into 
operational guidelines for service delivery.  
In post-conflict countries, experience has 
shown that systemic and programmatic 
policy formulation has proved useful in 
guiding rehabilitation and reform.  In 
Kosovo, for example, a systemic interim 
health policy was developed that appears 
to have been successful in setting the 
future framework for a reformed health 
sector, and in channelling large amounts of 
donor funds into these reforms.  In 
complex emergencies, the effectiveness of 
health policy frameworks remains 
untested, although experience from 
Somalia shows that such frameworks are 
useful to humanitarian agencies and 
donors as they provide policy guidance 
and promote a co-ordinated approach.     
 
Policy formulation in complex political 
emergencies is complicated as there is no 
legitimate government to take control of 
the policy process, which includes agenda 
setting, policy design and implementation.  
Thus, the question arises as to which of the 
multitude of humanitarian and political 
actors, none of which have authority over 
the others, should take part in, and/or lead 
the policy process.  Questions as to the 
 v
role of health policy in complex 
emergencies, and the effectiveness of the 
policy process remain unanswered and 
require further research. 
 
Based on experiences found in the 
literature, health policy formulation in 
both types of settings should be made 
more inclusive and collaborative, and 
issues of legitimacy should be explicitly 
addressed.  In some cases, the creation of a 
lead policy actor, for example the Somali 
Aid Co-ordination Body, was found to be 
useful.  Strong donor support for health 
policy formulation is necessary in order to 
ensure its implementation.   
 
Eight recommendations for post-conflict 
rehabilitation of the health sector that are 
found from a study on Afghanistan 
include:  (1)  
 
 Outline policy directions early in 
the post-conflict transition to set 
guidelines for initial rebuilding, 
and create a vision for the future. 
 Differentiate different policy 
“streams” into fast- and slow-track 
policies to meet both immediate 
and long-term needs. 
 Provide technical expertise in 
policy development to the health 
sector through committed staff and 
resources. 
 Focus on creating health policies at 
the health system level. 
 Do not rebuild the old health 
system as there is a new social, 
political, economic and cultural 
milieu and the conflict has 
enforced and/or created geographic 
and social inequities.  
 Ensure adequate ownership and 
consultation over the policy 
process to build capacity and 
generate commitment to the policy 
process and individual policies.    
                                                 
(1) Extracted from Bower. 2002. Reconstructing 
Afghanistan’s health system: Are lessons being 
learned from the past? LSHTM.  
 Link coordination to resource 
allocation to facilitate decisions-
making, prioritisation and 
implementation.  
 manage information proactively, 
ensuring that information is 
gathered, analysed and 
disseminated to relevant people.  
 
Many of these lessons could also be 
applied to ongoing complex political 
emergencies, however there has been so 
little research on policy processes in 
complex political emergencies that it is 
difficult to create a substantive list of 
lessons learned. 
 
Overall, health policy frameworks appear 
to have the potential to improve health 
care provision, enhance aid co-ordination, 
and maximise the effects of humanitarian 
aid.  Thus, there is a need for more 
operational research and piloting of 
approaches that will help in the 
formulation and implementation of health 
policy frameworks in complex political 
emergencies and post-conflict settings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is increasing recognition that the 
humanitarian aid system needs to be 
strengthened in order to improve its impact 
on vulnerable populations caught up in 
complex political emergencies.1  One 
means proposed is to bolster health policy 
processes, and the development of health 
policy frameworks to guide humanitarian 
actors in providing health services.2  This 
literature review was commissioned by the 
WHO’s Emergency and Humanitarian 
Action (EHA) Department to determine 
the extent of knowledge about health 
policy formulation in complex political 
emergencies and post-conflict countries.   
 
In complex political emergencies, weak 
epidemiological, social and political 
analyses, combined with different 
mandates, perceptions and values of 
organisations, often result in incoherent, 
fragmented health responses.  It is 
proposed that improved health policy 
formulation will lead to more co-ordinated 
and effective health service provision, and 
decrease excess morbidity and mortality.  
Improved policy formulation may also 
facilitate the early phase of a country’s 
transition to post-conflict.  The transition 
between post-conflict and complex 
emergencies is a fluid one, and countries 
sometimes oscillate between the two 
phases when power structures remain 
weak.  Once a country has moved into a 
stable post-conflict phase, policy-makers 
should broaden their perspective and focus 
on the creation of a sustainable health 
system.  
 
In addition to supporting health policy 
processes, two other means to strengthen 
the humanitarian system will be examined 
in this document, (2 )  3 both of which have 
                                                 
(2 ) Other suggestions to improving humanitarian 
aid, besides improving aid coordination 
mechanisms and stimulating health policy 
processes include improved standards, as laid out 
in guidelines such as Sphere and the Humanitarian 
implications for health policy formulation.  
First, initiatives are on-going to improve 
aid co-ordination mechanisms (such as the 
consolidated appeals process and sector-
wide approaches) in order to improve 
needs assessments, prioritisation of health 
services, and the creation of strategies to 
guide the allocation of funding.4  New 
contracting mechanisms are also being 
developed, such as performance-based 
partnership agreements, which can be 
loosely classified as a new type of aid 
coordination mechanism.  Second, there 
have been calls for research to strengthen 
the evidence-base of health interventions 
for dispersed populations in complex 
political emergencies.  Such research is 
currently lacking, and is vital in providing 
an improved evidence-base for health 
policy formulation.5  
 
This literature review investigates current 
knowledge about the formulation of health 
policy frameworks and the processes that 
are used to develop them in post-conflict 
countries and complex political 
emergencies, and explores whether they 
have proved useful in guiding the 
multitude of health sector actors.  The first 
section begins with a brief overview of 
complex political emergencies and their 
impact on health and health systems.  It 
then describes some of the challenges 
faced by organisations working in complex 
political emergencies and post-conflict 
countries, and summarises some of the 
lessons learned.  The second section 
focuses on issues of health policy 
formulation in chronic complex 
                                                                      
Accountability project, and the introduction of 
logical frameworks and evaluations to assess 
performance. Quality management models that 
institutionalize learning, and self-regulation rather 
than accreditation by donors may also prove to be 
the way forward.  Finally, more evaluations of 
system-wide performance, such as the Interagency 
Rwanda study, need to be developed to assess the 
influence and activities of the various political, 
donor, and humanitarian actors (see endnote 3). 
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emergencies and post-conflict countries.  It 
provides an overview of the nature of 
health policy, and describes how conflict 
impacts on the formulation and 
implementation of health policy.  The third 
section describes the need for research on 
health policy processes and on current 
public health interventions.  The final part 
of the document concludes with discussion 
and recommendations for supporting the 
health policy process in both complex 
political emergencies and post-conflict 
countries.  
 
 
COMPLEX POLITICAL EMERGENCIES AND POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES 
 
THE NATURE OF COMPLEX POLITICAL 
EMERGENCIES  
 
Complex political emergencies have been 
defined as conflicts that have all, or many 
of the following characteristics:6 7  
 
 The conflict is often within and 
across state boundaries, as opposed 
to being purely inter- or intra-state 
(as opposed to wars, which are 
normally inter-state). 
 The conflict is often protracted for 
many years. 
 There is a collapse of state 
functions and structures 
(institutional collapse) 
 Violence is directed towards 
civilians and civil structures 
 There are many social cleavages 
between groups, many of whom 
are exploitative, predatory and are 
mobilised and manipulated by 
those who seek political and 
economic power and resources, as 
well as more basic needs such as 
security. 
 There is an absence of normal 
accountability mechanisms due to 
lack of legitimate governance.  
 
As of 2000, there were approximately 30 
active conflicts, and almost all were in less 
developed countries.8  The following table 
lists some current complex political 
emergencies and post-conflict countries.9   
 
 
Africa (1) Africa (2) Europe America Middle East Asia 
Angola + 
Burundi * 
C.A. Republic + 
Chad + 
Congo +  
D.R. Congo * 
Djibouti + 
Eritrea + 
Ethiopia + 
Guinea Bissau + 
Liberia * 
Mali + 
Mozambique + 
Namibia + 
Niger + 
Rwanda + 
Sierra Leone + 
Somalia * 
South Africa + 
Sudan * 
Uganda + 
Armenia + 
Azerbaijan + 
Bosnia + 
Croatia + 
Georgia + 
Former Yugoslav 
Republics of  Macedonia 
and Kosova + 
Former Yugloslav 
Republic + 
Russian Federation of 
Chechnya * 
Columbia * 
El Salvador + 
Guatemala + 
Haiti + 
Nicaragua + 
Peru + 
Algeria */+ 
Lebanon + 
West Bank * 
Yemen + 
Iraq + 
Afghanistan+ 
Cambodia + 
DPR Korea * 
East Timor + 
Indonesia 
(Malukus) * 
Sri Lanka * 
Tajikistan * 
Source: United Nations, World Bank, OECD, OCHA, Reliefweb 
+Countries emerging from violence (post-conflict)   *Countries experiencing violence and conflict  
 
 
The nature of conflict has been explored 
by various disciplines including 
economics10, health 11 12 development 
studies13 and political economics.14 15  
Various causes of conflict that have been 
proposed include political and economic 
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marginalisation and inequality leading to 
grievance, economic stagnation, heavy 
state intervention, presence of valuable 
commodities, environmental degradation, 
low levels of education (especially of 
young men), and the politicisation of 
ethnicity. 16   
 
In addition, many complex political 
emergencies began as cold war proxies - 
for example Angola, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. 17  The end of 
the Cold War in 1990 signalled a change 
in the nature of these wars.  
 
“… conflict has become identified 
less with the process of state 
formation, the common theme of 
an earlier generation of 
ideologically–motivated nationalist 
and revolutionary struggles.  
Rather, conflict is associated 
increasingly with a process of state 
disintegration, where the quest for 
power is linked to the economic 
and political ambitions of armed 
groups, not to the achievement of a 
clearly articulated socio-political 
agenda.”18  
 
Complex political emergencies can be 
divided into two categories – ideological, 
state-centred wars such as Eritrea and 
Nicaragua, and privatized, resource 
conflicts which are extractive and 
exploitive in nature, such as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
These two categorizations are not mutually 
exclusive - fragmentation can occur in an 
ideological war (S. Sudan) and vice-versa - 
however usually one motivation will 
remain prominent.  This affects the 
mechanisms used for conflict resolution – 
for example, in resource wars, it is 
important to confront groups with 
economic interests, and create financial 
incentives for peace.19    
 
The nature of the complex political 
emergency also affects the provision of 
health services and the ease of the post-
conflict transition.  In more ideological 
conflicts, state infrastructure and 
capabilities are weakened, but their 
functions are generally maintained to some 
degree.  In resource conflicts, state 
structures are more likely to collapse, as 
has happened in Somalia, the DRC and 
Afghanistan.  This has implications for 
organisations that are left to provide 
services during the emergency, and for 
rebuilding public sector services in post-
conflict countries.20 
 
 
IMPACT ON HEALTH INDICATORS AND 
HEALTH SYSTEMS  
 
Complex political emergencies are known 
to have a negative impact on social and 
economic conditions 21 and health 
indicators in general, 22 23 24 25 as detailed 
in case studies of Ethiopia 26,27 El 
Salvador28, Democratic Republic of 
Congo 29 30, Uganda31 32, Kosovo33 and 
Iraq.34  It is estimated that the number of 
direct deaths attributable to violence is 
increasing, such that by 2020, war will 
rank 8th in the global burden of disease 
league tables, alongside HIV/AIDs, 
tuberculosis and malaria. 35 36  
 
The global evidence base upon which 
these predictions are based is limited by 
the lack of epidemiological data on the 
direct and indirect effects(3)  of conflict on 
health.  This dearth of data is due to 
methodological shortcomings, restricted 
access to populations, and breakdown in 
health information systems during conflict. 
                                                 
(3) There are various definitions of direct and 
indirect deaths.  Murray defines direct effects as 
combat deaths, and indirect deaths “as the number 
of deaths following a war minus the number of 
deaths that would have occurred in the same period 
if the war had not occurred” (2002 Ibid).  Direct 
impact has also been defined as deaths, injury, 
disability and the destruction of the health services, 
and indirect impact, as, for example, the erosion of 
innovative health policies in favour of increasing 
military expenditure (Zwi and Ugalde, 1989 Ibid).  
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37 38 39  Recent work shows that it is 
possible to determine direct deaths from 
conflict using demographic analyses or 
indirect mortality measurements, however, 
it is more difficult to measure indirect 
deaths leading to under-estimation in many 
cases.40  
 
The impact of complex political 
emergencies on public health systems has 
been documented in some detail.41 42 43 44  
Health systems have been defined by the 
2000 World Health Report as  
 
“comprising all the organizations, 
institutions and resources that are 
devoted to procuring health 
actions.  A health action is defined 
as any effort, whether in personal 
health care, public health services 
or through inter-sectoral initiatives, 
whose primary purpose is to 
improve health.”45 
 
The main impacts on public health systems 
are outlined in Table 1, and can be 
classified as follows: a substantial decrease 
in amount of resources, large changes in 
the management and organisation of health 
services, and the evolution of different 
modes of delivery. 46  The impacts on 
private health provision and traditional 
medicine are not well-documented.47  
 
 
Table 1 – Impacts of Conflict on Health Systems 48 
 
Limited Resource Availability: 
Financial  
§ Diversion of resources to military 
§ Reduced revenue  
§ Reduced control over funds 
§ Increased dependence on aid 
 
Health workers 
§ Injured, killed and kidnapped 
§ Displaced to urban areas/out of country 
§ Disrupted training/supervision 
§ Poor morale  
§ Poorly paid, if at all 
 
Equipment and supplies 
§ Lack of drugs / maintenance 
§ Reduced access to technologies 
§ Inability to maintain cold chain  
 
Service infrastructure 
§ Destruction of clinics 
§ Disrupted referral and communication  
 
 
Management and Organisation of Health Services 
§ Diversion from development based programs  
§ More centralised, urban-based, vertical 
programmes 
§ Disruption of complex programmes  
§ Focus on the short term 
§ Limited scope for consultation 
§ Reduction in data for decision-making 
§ Limited management training 
§ Reduced ability to monitor funds and 
resources  
§ Increased fragmentation 
 
Changes in Service Delivery  
§ Shift from primary to secondary care 
§ Urbanisation of provision 
§ Decreased activity in periphery 
§ Disrupted campaigns, health promotion, 
disease control, outreach  
§ Reduced access and utilisation: fear, curfews, 
landmines, charges 
§ Increased private provision 
 
 
 
CHALLENGES TO WORKING IN COMPLEX 
POLITICAL EMERGENCIES  
 
Health care provision in complex political 
emergencies is a difficult task. Due to the 
collapse of the state, international 
organisations, including bi- lateral and 
multi- lateral donors, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and the UN 
intercede to provide essential health 
services.  Services provided are often of 
three types: health services in refugee and 
internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, 
control of epidemics, and primary health 
care for vulnerable, war-affected 
populations.49   
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Challenges for health service delivery 
include how to prioritise, implement and 
co-ordinate service provision, taking into 
account issues of equity and limited 
access.50  For dispersed populations, the 
problems are even more profound, and 
include: limited access to ill-defined and 
insecure regions; very limited household 
and financial assets; and difficulty in 
targeting assistance, made more 
complicated by pre-existing government 
services.   
 
Agencies must also learn to navigate donor 
relief, rehabilitation and development 
funding lines based on ideological 
constructs (for example, the often-
criticised relief to development 
continuum)51 that are often disconnected 
from political reality. 52 In addition, donors 
provide inappropriate funding lines. For 
example, in Sudan, donors shifted to 
development aid, despite the fact that the 
minimum requirements for this type of aid 
– improved security, human rights and 
access, empirical evidence that the 
emergency is over, and a legitimate 
government – were not in place.53   
  
Another challenge to working in conflict is 
collaborating with remaining national 
authorities - whether it be the Ministry of 
Health54 55 56and/or rebel forces57 - to 
provide minimal health care services.  
Engagement with these actors is made 
more complex, both in terms of politics 
and in terms of aid co-ordination, due to 
questions regarding these actors’ 
legitimacy and authority.  For example, in 
South Sudan, the challenge lay in liaising 
with various rebel groups and the 
Khartoum government to negotiate access 
to vulnerable populations.58  
 
In some complex political emergencies - 
most usually wars of liberation (for 
example Eritrea,59 Tigray, 60 and El 
Salvador61 - rebel groups create a primary 
health care system to provide necessary 
services to the war-wounded, and also to 
gain the support of the populace.  The 
challenge then becomes how to work with 
these authorities, and to support 
appropriate aspects of this health 
“system.”  Once the conflict ends, health 
planners need to examine how best to 
incorporate these (rebel) systems into the 
new government’s health system. 62  For 
example, in Mozambique from 1989-1995,  
 
“service provision in RENAMO-
controlled areas was high on the 
agenda of many donor agencies. 
Despite mutual distrust and 
occasional incidents, both parties 
allowed NGOs to revive services in 
these areas: the political 
significance of the indirect 
collaboration between hostile sides 
was remarkable.  Often, health 
services were the first signs of the 
coming normalisation of civil life.  
A comprehensive programme to 
retrain RENAMO health workers 
and to re- integrate them within the 
national health service was 
implemented, defusing a cause of 
tension and showing the MoH’s 
willingness to process on the 
reconciliation path.  RENAMO 
came to accept health workers from 
the government side to staff health 
facilities in their own areas.  The 
whole process powerfully 
contributed to the progressive 
reintegration of rebel areas into a 
common administration.”63  
 
Finally, there is on-going debate regarding 
whether international humanitarian 
assistance can support efforts to promote 
conflict prevention and peace-building.  
Many authors have argued that 
humanitarian aid, and in particular health 
initiatives, can be used to build peace and 
prevent conflict.64 65 6667  However, some 
have argued that such initiatives are based 
more on ideology than on evidence.68  For 
example, one study found that donors and 
organisations often lacked the contextual 
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knowledge and skills to be effective in this 
process, and that they found it difficult to 
engage with a state when it was party to 
the conflict.69 Also, it has been argued that 
local NGOs, which are the best placed for 
peace-building, are often insufficiently 
supported by the humanitarian system, and 
so peace-building is constrained.70  
 
 
POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES  
After a complex political emergency has 
ended, countries are classified as post-
conflict.  Post-conflict countries have been 
defined as having four characteristics: 1) 
the signing of a formal peace agreement; 
2) a process of political transition by 
elections, military or civilian coups 3) 
increased levels of security and 4) a 
perception among national and 
international actors that there is an 
opportunity for peace and recovery. 71  Not 
all of these factors must be present 
simultaneous ly.  For example, a peace 
accord may not be signed if there is a 
coup, as happened in Uganda in 1986 and 
Ethiopia in 1999.72  Also, post-conflict 
countries can be highly unstable, and some 
countries, such as Angola, Liberia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, repeatedly 
cycle between peace and war.73 
 
Post-conflict countries often have the 
following features.  The infrastructure (i.e. 
roads, communications, health centres, 
schools) has usually been damaged, with 
large economic and social consequences.  
The economy is structurally distorted with 
high military spending, a greatly reduced 
tax base, and a very developed, informal 
(and often illegally-based) economic 
system.  The social fabric has also been 
disturbed - communities are often 
dispersed, civil society is fragmented, and 
the means for violence are still in place.  
The legitimacy and legal status of the 
government (Afghanistan) and/or interim 
UN ‘government’ (Cambodia, Kosovo) is 
uncertain, especially during transitional 
periods to democratic systems.  The public 
administration is also limited in its 
capacity to provide a policy framework, 
mobilise and allocate resources, organise 
and regulate services, and absorb funds.74  
 
Within this context, there is often a large 
influx of funds to stimulate post-conflict 
reconstruction.  While this presents many 
opportunities, it can also pose problems 
due to the low absorptive capacity of the 
government.  Some international 
organizations have defined policy for post-
conflict reconstruction, 75 while others are 
still defining their role.  Lessons for post-
conflict rehabilitation are outlined in Box 
1,76 and include the development of a post-
conflict policy framework, the need for 
long term engagement, and a clarity of 
leadership, among others.   
 
There is a substantial literature on 
rehabilitation of the health sector in post-
conflict countries.77 78 79 80 81 82  Case 
studies include Nicaragua,83 Uganda,84 
Ethiopia,85 Cambodia,86 Kosovo,87 88 89 
Mozambique,90 91 92, Afghanistan, 93 94 
Angola,95 Chad,96 Palestine,97 Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,98 East 
Timor99 and Angola, Liberia and 
Cambodia.100  Based on the literature, the 
main challenges and lessons learned 
regarding the rehabilitation of health 
systems in post-conflict countries are 
outlined in Annex 1.  One of the most 
important findings is that in post-conflict 
countries, it is important to devise a 
national health policy framework at the 
beginning of the post-conflict process.  
 
The end of the initial post-conflict phase 
has been described as the normalisation of 
relations with the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund.101  Some 
countries, however, are referred to as 
being “post-conflict” for many years after 
the end of the war, and the World Bank is 
increasingly engaging in early post-
conflict reconstruction. 102   
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THE HEALTH POLICY PROCESS  
 
DEFINITIONS OF THE HEALTH POLICY 
PROCESS 
 
Health policy is one component of a public 
health system. Other components include 
resources, organisational structure, service 
delivery and management, and support 
systems.103  Broadly defined,  
 
“health policy embraces courses of 
action that affect the set of 
institutions, organisations, services 
and funding arrangements of the 
health care system.  It goes beyond 
health services, however, and 
includes actions or intended actions 
by public, private and voluntary 
organisations that have an impact 
on health.”104 
 
Health policy analysts divide health policy 
into four component parts - content, 
process, context and actors – each of 
which can be analysed in various ways.105  
Policy content can be described as  
 
“both technical policies, for 
example on malaria, AIDS, health 
promotion, and institutional 
policies, for example, regarding 
financing, the private sector, 
organisation and management of 
service delivery.  Part of the debate 
on priorities in health policy 
research revolves around the 
relative balance between technical 
and institutional concerns.”106 
 
Policy content has been described as 
operating at four main levels:107   
 
§ Systemic – where basic objectives and 
principles are decided (i.e. the basic 
structure of the health system). 
§ Programmatic – where priorities are set 
for interventions and are translated into 
Box 1: Lessons for post-conflict rehabilitation have been distilled in a recent report by the 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.  It outlines nine key lessons for post-conflict 
rehabilitation from more than 50 formal evaluations of post-conflict initiatives.   
 
1. Develop a coherent policy framework that recognizes “humanitarian space” 
2. Commit to long-term and inclusive international engagement to support the peace-building 
process 
3. Approach and manage the situation as a regional crisis – there is a need to coordinate 
approaches inside the affected country with approaches in neighboring states through a 
regional political framework  
4. Clarify structure, leadership and do not “fly national flag” 
5. Military forces should provide security rather than aid 
6. Delegate authority, flexibility and strengthened monitoring regarding: a shared vision 
between donors and key local actors, joint needs assessment, early support for the rule of 
law and land tenure institutions, delegation of spending authority to the field, and no tying 
of funds; tracking systems for aid flows; clear hand-over from relief to development 
authorities; debt relief and underwriting of recurrent costs for civil administration.  
7. Strengthen, use and support local institutional capacity 
8. Understand and control the ‘war economy’ 
9. Strengthen accountability and learning mechanisms of the aid system  
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operational guidelines for service 
delivery (priorities are often based on 
burden of disease, cost-effectiveness, 
and political and societal values 
including equity and human rights)108 
§ Organisational - concerned with the 
structure of institutions responsible for 
policy implementation 
§  Instrumental - concerned with 
generating information to enhance the 
functioning of the health system.  
 
The policy process is the setting of the 
policy agenda, through to policy design 
and implementation. 109  There are many 
different models that policy analysts use to 
examine the policy process110 – four that 
are commonly used are described below.  
The first is a prescriptive model (the 
‘rational’ model) that assumes that the 
process of policy formulation is rational 
and based on correct information. 
However, in reality, it has been found that 
this is often not the case. For example, in 
Uganda,  
 
“’... for years, policy was 
established by decree, no one knew 
what health policy really was; over 
the years it had become an ad hoc 
collection of declarations rather 
than an integrated legal framework 
for government action.’”111   
 
Some analysts propose that the policy 
process is more incremental, whereby 
policy-making consists of slow bargaining 
between different interest groups to select 
priorities (incrementalist model).  Others 
argue that policy-makers undertake a 
“broad review of the policy field without 
engaging in the detailed exploration of 
options as suggested by the rational 
model” (mixed scanning model).112  
Finally, there is the ‘punctuated equilibria’ 
model, which has recently been applied to 
priority setting in the international health 
policy arena.  It argues that priorities are 
set via a “complex pattern of periods of 
stability, punctuated by bursts of attention” 
that are stimulated by new evidence and 
perceived need for health care.113  Each of 
these models attempts to separate the 
policy process into its component parts to 
facilitate analysis; in reality, the policy 
process is likely to have characteristics of 
all these models. 
 
A large variety of contextual factors - 
political, financial, social and cultural – 
impact on the formulation process.114  One 
author has grouped these into four key 
influences on policy choice in less 
developed countries: quality of technical 
analysis; amount of political stability and 
support; capacity, motivation and support 
of the bureaucracy; and the influence of 
international actors.115  There are many 
other models that categorize contextual 
factors in different ways; the discourse 
tends to centre on the role of the state, the 
nature of culture and civil society, and the 
balance between state and society. 116 
 
Finally, policy analysts consider the role of 
actors and their power relationships, as 
policy-making often depends more on 
political compromise than on rational 
debate (stakeholder or political mapping 
can be useful in detailing these power 
structures, and helps illuminate actors’ 
agendas).117  The concept of public policy 
implies the presence of strong state with 
the authority and the legitimacy to 
represent the interests of a population, and 
with the technical and administrative 
competence to finance, implement and 
regulate that policy. 118  It also implies the 
presence of a strong civil society which 
can engage with the state. However, 
policy-making can occur in states that 
have weak governance, such as in post-
conflict and complex political 
emergencies, and stimulation of the policy 
process can facilitate the building of 
stronger state structures.  
 
In conflict and post-conflict transition, 
civil society is impaired, and the state’s 
authority and legitimacy may be contested 
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by national and international actors.  The 
latter often presents an intractable problem 
for international actors because they do not 
wish to support non- legitimate regimes.119  
During periods of post-conflict transition, 
the question of legitimacy often arises 
when a new government has gained power 
through non-democratic processes and/or a 
transitional government is put in place 
until elections can be held.  For example, 
in Cambodia, the majority of development 
aid was channelled through the NGO 
system instead of the transitional 
government, the pretext being limited 
government capacity. 120  However 
research showed that in reality, donor 
countries were hesitant to engage with the 
transitional government, preferring to wait 
until the election two years later.  This 
resulted in a fragmentation of services and 
a weakening of government capacity and 
human resources, and undermined 
attempts to promote ‘rational’ allocation of 
resources to create a sustainable health 
system. 121 
 
In summary, health policy analysts focus 
on the actors involved in the policy 
process, the context in which they work, 
the processes used to create, change and 
implement policy, and the context within 
which policy is developed.  By thinking 
through the policy implications for 
different actors, understanding the 
influence of group interests and values on 
policy choice and implementation, and 
determining whether the capacity and 
conditions exist for successfully 
implementing a policy, it is possible to 
alter the policy process and facilitate a 
policy’s acceptance.122  
 
 
THE DISRUPTION OF THE HEALTH 
POLICY PROCESS  
 
Case studies that have explicitly examined 
the health policy process in post-conflict 
countries include: Uganda,123 
Cambodia,124 Kosovo,125 Mozambique126 
and Afghanistan. 127  Much less has been 
documented on the policy process in 
countries in conflict. Case studies include 
Mozambique,128 Nicaragua,129 and 
Angola.130  Together, these experiences 
have shown that during a complex political 
emergency and in the post-conflict 
transition, the policy process is disrupted 
and fragmented at all levels, especially at 
the systemic level.131   
 
Uganda provides an explicit description of 
the impact of war on the health policy 
process, and the factors that subsequently 
influenced it.  The war, which had been 
ongoing since the 1970’s, ended when 
Yoweri Museveni and the National 
Resistance Movement gained power in 
1986.  The main impact of the war on 
health policy formulation was a 
breakdown of the policy institutions, 
resulting in a policy vacuum at the 
systemic level, particularly with regards to 
primary health care and health care 
financing.  The lack of a strong national 
health policy resulted in a proliferation of 
vertical projects run through systems 
parallel to the government, an emphasis on 
infrastructure, and fragmented service 
provision by non-governmental 
organisations.  This approach undermined 
the capacity of the government, and 
resulted in significant inefficiencies in 
health service delivery. 132   
 
When the Ugandan situation was analysed 
in terms of the four factors influencing 
policy choice-- technical analysis, political 
stability and support, bureaucratic 
motivation, and international leverage -- it 
was found that all four factors played a 
large part in determining health policy.  
Technical analysis was weak due to 
limited data, failure to calculate recurrent 
costs, the time pressures of short funding 
cycles, and limited analysis of political and 
social constraints.  Also, the problems in 
the health system were deemed to be infra-
structural rather than structural, an 
underlying and probably incorrect 
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perception that greatly influenced 
subsequent policy content and process. 
  
In terms of political stability and support, 
the Ugandan government saw health as a 
low priority.  Vested interests supported 
physical rehabilitation and selective 
primary health care, and this, combined 
with public support for restoration of the 
old health system because it signified a 
return to normalcy, tended to promote 
health policies that favoured infrastructure 
development and vertical programs. Third, 
the bureaucracy had a limited ability to 
define policy options at a systemic level, 
and lacked interest in previous policy 
reviews, partly due to low pay and morale.  
Finally, international donors were poorly 
co-ordinated, had a preference for vertical 
programs and capital costs, tended to 
program in terms of expertise, not needs, 
and disconnected rehabilitation from 
longer-term development.   
 
In conclusion, all of the above four factors 
influenced the formulation and 
implementation of systemic and 
programmatic policy, and resulted in a 
health care system that was not as 
appropriate and cost-effective as it could 
have been.  These four factors have 
influenced policy-formulation in other 
post-conflict countries, and it is 
illuminating to analyse these factors when 
engaged in the policy process, or preparing 
to support or create policy formulation 
mechanisms.  
 
 
REBUILDING THE HEALTH POLICY 
PROCESS 
 
There are various ways to improve and/or 
rebuild the health policy process.  One 
means that has been proposed is to ensure 
that recent initiatives to strengthen aid co-
ordination mechanisms include measures 
to strengthen the health policy process.  In 
developing and post-conflict countries, the 
aid coordination mechanisms under review 
include sector-wide approaches (SWAps) 
and performance-based partnership 
agreements (PPAs).  In complex political 
emergencies, attention has focused on the 
Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and 
its Common Humanitarian Action Plan 
(CHAP).  All of these aid co-ordination 
mechanisms include a policy formulation 
stage, however the exact means to create 
coherent, systemic, (government-based) 
health policy using these mechanisms have 
not been fully developed.  
 
Some countries, such as Mozambique, 
Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Somalia, have created country-
specific co-ordination mechanisms that 
focus directly on health policy 
formulation.  The effectiveness of these 
mechanisms has varied, and there is need 
for further research and documentation of 
these processes.  
 
The following sections are arranged as 
follows.  First, reasons to improve aid co-
ordination mechanisms and initiatives to 
improve three major aid co-ordination 
mechanisms (Swaps, PPAs and CAPs) and 
their importance to health policy 
formulation are described.  Then, country-
specific initiatives that have focused 
directly on health policy formulation are 
examined in post-conflict countries 
(Kosovo and Afghanistan) and complex 
political emergencies (DRC and Somalia). 
Finally, the limitations of aid-coordination 
mechanisms, and their ability to stimulate 
health policy formulation processes are 
outlined.  
 
Why Improve Aid Coordination 
Mechanisms 
 
There have been recent calls by the 
humanitarian community to improve 
provision of basic needs to people affected 
by conflict, and to maximise the effects of 
humanitarian aid.133 In response, studies 
are currently being done on how to 
improve aid co-ordination, needs 
 11 
assessments, humanitarian resource 
mobilisation and allocation, and donor 
behaviour.134  This section will focus on 
initiatives to improve aid co-ordination 
mechanisms between donors, UN 
agencies, NGOs and national governments 
as these initiatives have a direct effect on 
the creation of health policy formulation 
mechanisms.  
 
There is a large amount of peer-reviewed 
literature on aid co-ordination in 
developing countries.135 136 137 138 139  
Documentation of aid coordination in 
complex political emergencies and post-
conflict countries includes case studies on 
Angola,140 Afghanistan, 141 the Great Lakes 
region and Rwanda,142 Cambodia143, 
Uganda,144 Mozambique,145 and more 
general reviews. 146 
 
Improved aid co-ordination mechanisms 
are seen to be important for the following 
reasons.  First, “evidence is mounting that 
without effective co-ordination 
arrangements, donors may weaken rather 
than improve fragile health systems, 
undermining attempts to reform those 
systems.”147  There are increasing calls for 
responsible donor behaviour and greater 
aid coordination given that the policy 
process is increasingly being shifted to the 
international arena, and donors have an 
influence on policy formulation. 148 149 150 
151   
 
“The weakness of public policy in 
these [developing] countries, 
together with the current 
preference of official aid 
organisations for policy-based 
lending,… means that the locus of 
health policy-making is 
increasingly internationalised – 
with decisions regarding major 
elements of the content of health 
policy in recipient countries 
frequently being made in 
Washington, Copenhagen, and 
London, rather than in national 
capitals.”152  
 
Recent results from the Global 
Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health should help to focus attention on 
the need to support government and build 
capacity.  It concluded that it is more cost-
effective to strengthen the capacity of the 
government than it is to provide vertical 
programs. 153    
 
“when spread across a number of 
interventions, the costs of the three 
major improvements needed [to the 
health system] – expanded physical 
infrastructure, improved training 
and performance of health workers 
and managers, and strengthened 
links between the health system 
and communities – will be smaller 
than the costs of trying to bypass 
the problems of limited capacity 
[through vertical programs].”154  
 
This economic argument should stimulate 
donors to concentrate more on institutional 
capacity building in developing countries, 
as well as nascent post-conflict 
governments.(4)   This may have 
implications for the health policy process 
because supported governments would 
increasingly be able to lead health policy 
formulation and implementation. 
 
Finally, the geo-political landscape has 
changed dramatically since Sept 11, 2001. 
At the recent Monterrey Financing for 
Development Summit in April 2002, 
poverty and inequality were identified as 
one of the root causes of conflict, violence 
                                                 
(4) The Commission has also called for more 
research into supporting health system 
development in “highly constrained countries,” 
which includes countries in conflict and post-
conflict settings.  Research would include how to 
set up health systems, prioritise health services and 
do this in a cost-effective manner given the fiscal 
constraints . 
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and terrorism.  The Monterrey Consensus 
that emerged reinforced the idea that good 
governance, economic policies and legal 
structures would be rewarded with 
increased aid and trade initiatives.  The 
implication of this Consensus for the 
humanitarian sector is that initiatives 
which support good governance and policy 
formulation are seen to be important as 
they may lead to increased funding. 155   
 
 
Types of Aid Co-ordination 
Mechanisms 
 
Aid co-ordination mechanisms in 
developing countries include: donor co-
ordination units within a Ministry of 
Health (MoH), geographical zoning, 
donor-only groups, a lead donor agency, 
regular collective MoH-donor 
consultations, general strategy/plans 
developed by MoH, earmarked budget 
support, pooling/ basketing of funds, 
common systems for resource 
management, sector investment programs 
and sector-wide approaches.156  Some 
mechanisms are used more for 
consultation, policy harmonisation and the 
co-ordination of inputs.  Others are more 
operational, and are used to manage inputs 
through agreed financing, accounting, or 
monitoring systems.   Many of these 
instruments have not been that successful 
in developing countries– for example, few 
embrace all donors or a large proportion of 
aid, few are commanded by recipient 
authorities, and few have the authority to 
ensure participant compliance.157   
 
Many of the above co-ordination 
mechanisms are used in post-conflict 
countries and complex political 
emergencies.  Three major aid 
coordination mechanisms are discussed in 
more detail below: sector wide approaches 
(SWAps), performance-based partnership 
agreements (PPAs)(5)  and the consolidated 
appeal process (CAP).  All of these 
mechanisms require the development of 
health policy frameworks to guide 
allocation of resources, however the exact 
mechanism by which they do so needs to 
be further developed.  
 
Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps) 
 
SWAps have been held up as the best 
possibility for aid co-ordination in 
developing countries because they avoid 
the problem of questionable legitimacy of 
donor decision-making, and aim to pass 
authority for policy formulation and  
programming to national governments.158  
They work on the basis of pooled funds,(6) 
which governments then use according to 
agreed upon policies and strategies.  Thus 
SWAp mechanisms necessitate the 
development of collaborative, coherent 
health policy and strategies to guide the 
development of a health system and the 
provision of health services.159 
 
Experience to date has been relatively 
positive in developing countries,160 
however it remains to be seen how 
successful SWAps will be in post-conflict 
countries. One obstacle for their use is that 
nascent governments have less robust 
policy processes and financial systems 
than more stable developing countries, 
which affects donor confidence in 
accountability.  Despite this, East Timor 
has recently used a SWAp via a multi-
donor trust fund.  The result was positive 
as it “allowed for coherent sector 
development, ensuring the sustained 
financing of core activities and non-
duplication of efforts.”161  
                                                 
(5)  PPAs are a contracting mechanism and not an 
aid coordination mechanism per se.  However, they 
are classified as an aid coordination mechanism in 
this paper because they require, to a large extent, 
the creation of co-ordinated health policy by the 
Ministry of Health. 
(6) Financing instruments include sector budget 
support, pooling agreements, basket arrangement s 
and even tied aid. 
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There is little mention of using SWAps in 
complex political emergencies in the peer-
reviewed humanitarian assistance 
literature, and the effectiveness of SWAps 
remains untested in the humanitarian 
context.  One factor against their success is 
that there is no nationally representative, 
legitimate government body through 
which to channel humanitarian aid.  
Another factor that may hinder their 
success is the global trend to earmark 
humanitarian aid, (7 )  which leads to 
greater inflexibility in aid response and 
tighter controls on spending. 162 
 
Instead of SWAps per se, some donors 
have suggested other mechanisms to pool 
funds in complex political emergencies.163  
Such mechanisms could be modelled on 
UN common funding mechanisms. 
  
“Common funds are a more rapid 
and flexible mechanism to meet 
critical needs of vulnerable 
populations. An inter-agency 
consultative and participatory 
process to prioritise, allocate funds 
and evaluate impact and 
implementation is part of this 
                                                 
(7)  From 1996-99, the total amount of un-
earmarked (multilateral) aid grew by 32% 
compared to 1988-90. In the same period, 
earmarked (bi-lateral) aid grew by 150%, and the 
European Commission increased it by 475% .  
Some of this disparity is due to the fact that the 
Organisation for Economic Co -operation and 
Development (OECD) changed their reporting 
requirements in 1992, such that OECD members 
could include in their humanitarian assistance the 
costs for supporting refugees in their own country.  
However, the trend is also driven by: an increasing 
tendency to give funding directly to NGOs; a rise 
in the earmarking of funds to multilateral 
organisations (which allows donors to influence 
policy and increase their profile); and more calls 
for accountability.  Finally, donors are sub-
contracting work to “non-traditional providers” 
such as logistics companies, civil defence 
organisations, commercial security and other 
military and paramilitary organisations (Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) April 2002. 
International humanitarian action: a review of 
policy trends. Briefing Paper. www.odi.org.uk). 
arrangement. These funds, such as 
the Emergency Response Fund in 
Angola, the NGO Funding 
Mechanisms in DPR Korea and 
Indonesia, and Emergency 
Humanitarian Interventions in the 
DRC provide bridge-financing for 
NGOs and allow for quick impact 
projects in response to an upsurge 
in needs. These funds have been 
used to respond to sudden 
population displacements, disease 
outbreaks, and to prevent breaks in 
delivery of essential supplies.”164 
 
Common fund mechanisms do not 
necessarily result in the development of 
health policy frameworks however.  One 
possibility for their further development 
may be to link common funds to policy-
making mechanisms.  
 
Performance-based Partnership 
Agreements 
 
The World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, among others, are 
encouraging governments of developing 
countries to set policy and regulate 
services, but to refrain from actual service 
provision.  Within the health sector, 
agencies other than the government will be 
expected to provide health services within 
a clearly defined policy framework set by 
a Ministry of Health. 165    
 
One mechanism that is used to define this 
new contractual relationship between the 
government and health service providers 
such as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), are Performance-based 
Partnership Agreements (PPAs).  PPAs 
will enable NGOs and other non-
governmental entities to submit bids to run 
health services in a specified geographic 
area, and deliver a basic service package 
according to specifications and indicators 
set by the government.  They will be paid 
directly by donor agencies based on 
satisfactory progress, which is defined as 
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actual performance as measured by an 
independent third party.  The promotion of 
PPAs has been based, in part, on a 
successful pilot programme in Cambodia, 
where improved uptake of health services 
was linked with reduced costs for the poor, 
and an overall reduction in costs.166  Most 
recently, the PPA system is currently being 
applied in the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan’s health system. 167 
 
The implications of the PPA approach is 
that coherent health policy formulation is 
necessary to provide guidance to health 
service providers about issues such as 
selection of priority services, financing 
mechanisms and regions to be targeted.  
With the advent of PPAs, the health policy 
process will have to be strengthened and 
made more inclusive, ensuring that 
implementing agencies as well as 
government are part of the policy 
process.168 
 
The Consolidated Appeal Process 
  
An important aid coordination mechanism 
for humanitarian actors in complex 
political emergencies is the Consolidated 
Appeals Process (CAP).  The main aim of 
the CAP is to consolidate and increase the 
coherence of the fundraising appeals by 
various humanitarian agencies working in 
complex political emergencies.  Co-
ordinated by the UN’s Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), CAPs have raised over US $17 
billion in contributions during 165 appeals 
over ten years.  The primary importance of 
the CAP lies in the fact that it is the only 
co-ordination mechanism that brings 
together various UN agencies, Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 
members, NGOs and national governments 
to conduct shared analyses, define 
common goals and strategies, delineate 
sector objectives and lay out future 
activities for a humanitarian emergency.  
The CAP is also important in that it 
provides an effective mechanism for rapid 
mobilisation of funds for relief, and helps 
ensure that funding gaps are filled during 
the transition to post-conflict.   However, 
there are numerous problems with the 
CAP as detailed in a recent external 
review: 169 
 
§ Weak coordination mechanisms – 
While some co-ordination groups 
continue to function after the 
annual CAP has been submitted, 
some disband until the next CAP is 
required, thus hindering ongoing 
collaborative strategic planning and 
analysis. Also, not all stakeholders 
are fully involved – for example, 
NGOs participation ranges from 
attendance at workshops to being a 
full partner in the appeal process.  
Many NGOs do not take part at all, 
preferring to raise funds directly 
from donors.170 
 
§ Weak needs assessments – CAPs 
do not report on needs where 
agencies have been unable to 
secure access.171  Also, needs 
assessments are not done in a 
uniform manner, which makes it 
difficult to allocate resources 
equitably between countries, as 
well as within a country.   
 
§ Inappropriate resource allocation - 
There are enormous discrepancies 
in allocations that cannot be 
explained solely by different costs 
or proven need.  For instance, the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia 
received US$166 per capita 
compared to Eritrea, which 
received US$2.172  These types of 
discrepancies have been attributed 
to “what agencies think the market 
can bear rather than an objective 
indication of need,”173 resulting in 
a gap between needs and response.  
Donors have also admitted that 
their funding decisions are not 
based directly on the CAP, and that 
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the CAP is unlikely to convince 
them to fund a project that they 
would not otherwise fund.  This 
leads to frustration that there is 
little correlation between the 
quality of the CAP and funding 
received.174  
 
§ Decreased resource mobilization – 
The CAP remains the primary 
means for coordinated resource 
mobilization, however its share of 
total humanitarian aid funds has 
fallen from 40% to 30% over the 
last ten years,175 despite an increase 
in humanitarian funding.176  This 
has been attributed to competition 
from other NGOs for donor funds, 
and the fact that the appeals now 
include funding for transitional 
activities, which historically have 
not attracted much funding. 177  As 
of mid-year 2002, the 18 appeals, 
excluding Afghanistan, have only 
received a 29% response rate.178 
 
§ Inadequate strategic planning – 
Due to inadequate prioritisation 
and screening processes, projects 
often do not meet the objectives as 
set out in the CAP. Agencies 
sometimes design their projects 
prior to the setting of a strategic 
plan and objectives due to different 
project timelines and funding 
cycles.  This undermines the 
CAP’s strategic purpose, which is 
to identify, prioritise and raise 
funds for the most pressing 
needs.179  
 
§ Inadequate monitoring systems – 
Monitoring systems are weak, and 
are undermined by the lack of 
quality baseline data. This affects 
the quality of the needs 
assessments, and ongoing strategic 
planning.  Without this 
information, the CAP’s ability (and 
thus credibility) to produce 
evidence-based strategic plans is 
weakened.180 
 
§ Insufficient use in advocacy – The 
CAP should be used to point out 
the large discrepancies in funding, 
which undermines the 
humanitarian principles of 
neutrality and impartiality.  Also, 
CAPs should be used to highlight 
issues of human rights abuses, 
access problems, and lack of 
respect for humanitarian 
principles.181  
 
Due to the above weaknesses in the CAP 
system, numerous studies have recently 
been commissioned on how to improve the 
CAP, including a CAP review, a DFID 
study on improving financing and aid 
flows, and the IASC working group on the 
CAP.182   
 
One focus of discussion is to separate the 
process of formulating the Common 
Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) from 
the appeals process, which is only open to 
members of the Interagency Steering 
Committee.  This may encourage 
humanitarian actors who normally don’t 
become involved in the CAP process to 
play an increased role in creating policy 
and strategy for the sector.183  
 
The drive for reform of the CAP reflects 
the view that the CAP remains the best 
humanitarian aid co-ordination mechanism 
currently available to the UN agencies for 
joint planning, quick mobilisation of 
funds, and for provision of links between 
projects during transition phases.184  
However, agencies involved in reforming 
the CAP must be cognisant that the CAP 
cannot ‘co-ordinate away’ structural 
obstacles, such as different funding cycles, 
project timeframes, donor and agency 
mandates, and discordant foreign policy 
and politics.  
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Country-Specific Aid Co-ordination 
Mechanisms used to Create Health 
Policy 
 
Post-Conflict Settings 
 
The development of systemic and 
programmatic health policy through 
country-specific aid co-ordination 
mechanisms has been important in post-
conflict countries, as indicated by 
experiences in S. Africa,185 Palestine,186 
Mozambique,187 Kosovo,188 
Afghanistan, 189 and Cambodia, Angola 
and Liberia.190  In post-conflict South 
Africa, early discussions between the 
African National Congress and the 
progressive health movement facilitated 
later policy processes.  In Palestine, a draft 
health policy191 provided an important 
forum for debate between key actors and 
donors, although it was never adopted due 
to issues surrounding mandate, ownership 
and participation. 192   
 
In contrast, the experience of Mozambique 
highlights the importance of policy 
formulation created before the peace-
accord was signed in 1992.  
 
“ Frameworks for post-war 
reconstruction, completed before 
the peace agreement, stressed 
equity and affordability, thus 
attracting considerable donor 
support.  The planning exercise 
kept central officials concentrated 
during a period of military 
stalemate, contributing to a 
relatively high morale within MoH 
and avoiding the loss of key 
cadres… In the frantic climate of 
the transitional period, the pressing 
demands of reconstruction 
sidelined planning activities.  Thus, 
the plans finalised by 1992 were 
successfully implemented, whereas 
areas lacking a clear MoH policy 
were left open to many 
inconclusive donor- led proposals.” 
193  
 
The case study of Mozambique clearly 
demonstrates how health policy 
formulation during the transition to a post-
conflict phase aided the nascent MoH in 
planning and implementing future health 
sector objectives and activities. 
 
Kosovo provides the best example of the 
development of a health policy framework 
in a post-conflict setting.  In Kosovo, a 
systemic, interim health policy document 
was developed and promulgated within 
three months of the end of the war in 
1999.194  It was drawn up by the WHO in 
consultation with some members of the 
Kosovar medical community, and 
promoted reform of the health system 
towards a more western European model.  
The document outlined policy goals and 
organisational principles of the reformed 
health system.  It then detailed the 
structure of primary and secondary care, 
hospital services, public and 
environmental health, reproductive health 
policy, drug policy, and plans for the 
physically disabled.  It also contained a 
health management plan, principles for 
human resources development, municipal 
and regional plans and budgets, and 
essential infrastructure and support.   It 
concluded with a six-month action plan, as 
well as a medium-term health strategy.  
The policy document aimed to ensure 
sustainability of the health system by 
clearly stating that humanitarian resources 
would not be used to expand the health 
system beyond the limits of national 
revenue, and would only be used to repair 
damage sustained because of the war and 
years of neglect, and to fund problems that 
were created specifically by the 
emergency.   It also allowed for inputs into 
orientation and training.  
 
While Kosovo’s interim policy was judged 
to be successful, there were some issues 
that arose as a result of the process used to 
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develop it.195  Some questioned whether 
reform at such an early stage was feasible 
and appropriate because local capacity was 
limited, and service provision was a 
priority.  Others felt that local ownership 
was lacking due to the restricted number of 
consultations. ( 8)   This was overcome over 
time by strengthening the Ministry of 
Health, who gradually took control of the 
process, and ensured that ongoing 
consultations were made more inclusive.  
 
Overall, it was concluded that while 
implementation of the health policy was 
not uniform or complete, the policy played 
an important role in co-ordinating 
significant amounts of external assistance 
into the development and reform of the 
health sector without jeopardising relief 
activities.  The report concluded that WHO 
could promote the development of such 
health policy frameworks, but that this 
would require the WHO to “develop and 
maintain the capacity for rapid situational 
analysis and policy development and be 
willing and able to deploy that capacity 
rapidly.”196    
 
A recently conducted case study on the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan’s health 
system examined the current health policy 
process in detail.197  The author analysed 
four post-conflict case studies (Cambodia, 
Uganda, Mozambique and Kosovo) and 
based on these, compiled eight common 
lessons for post-conflict rehabilitation of 
the health sector (Annex 1).  These were 
then compared against the reconstruction 
process in Afghanistan.  The author’s 
conclusions for the health policy process 
were as follows:  
 
1. “Early and direct placement of 
strategic policy expertise in the 
                                                 
 (8)  Members of the Albanian medical community 
had taken part in the consultations, however the 
Serbian medical community had refused to take 
part.  Also, some stakeholders felt that the policy 
was made too quickly, while others concluded that 
it was not completed quickly enough. 
ministry is critical to the effective 
organisation of both national and 
international reconstruction 
activity.” Mechanisms should be 
created to ensure immediate 
dispatch of a policy team. 
 
2. “Policy work should be separated 
into fast and slow tracks so that 
responses can take advantage of 
narrow and urgent ‘windows of 
opportunity’ while embarking on 
essential consultation and capacity 
building in other areas.”  To 
respond to immediate needs, some 
policy issues need to be fast-
tracked and strategic guidance 
given to donors.   There also needs 
to be a slow-track to deal with 
sustainability issues and future 
development of the health system.  
 
3. “Co-ordination is barely a useful 
term anymore and needs to be 
‘unpacked’ to its constituent parts 
if progress towards its multifarious 
goals (resource allocation, 
operational partnership, technical 
policy development, and 
information management) is to be 
achieved.”  Post-conflict actors 
must review co-ordination 
structures with particular attention 
to interface areas and feedback 
channels. 
 
4. “Lack of attention to dissemination 
of information undermines efforts 
in co-ordination and 
communication.”  Therefore, it is 
important to establish mechanisms 
to both collect AND disseminate 
information. 
 
5. NGOs need financial, moral and 
technical support to build capacity 
to respond to the demands of health 
reconstruction post conflict.”198 
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All of these activities should take place as 
soon after ‘peace’ as possible – i.e. days 
and weeks, rather than months. 
 
Specific and practical recommendations 
for supporting the health policy process in 
Afghanistan included: urgent placement of 
a long-term strategic policy team in the 
ministry; recruitment of facilitator/public 
health specialist to help improve capacity 
in the NGO community; establishment of a 
health sector newsletter; and clarification 
and strengthening of co-ordination 
mechanisms.  The uptake of these 
recommendations is being spurred by the 
PPA program, which is currently being 
implemented in Afghanistan.  
 
Complex Political Emergency Settings 
 
Systemic policies, like the one developed 
in Kosovo are rarely made during complex 
political emergencies because 
governments and/or rebel groups do not 
have the authority and legitimacy to create 
and implement national policy.  
Programmatic policies are also rarely 
developed by humanitarian actors and 
government/rebel groups due to unclear 
lines of authority, limited policy 
leadership, a multitude of mandates and 
weak aid co-ordination mechanisms.  For 
example, the CAP produces strategic 
objectives and plans that could be 
classified as programmatic policy, 
however, these documents have limited 
legitimacy due to the weaknesses in the 
CAP previously described.  If the CAP, 
and more specifically the formulation of 
the CHAP, was greatly strengthened and 
made all- inclusive, it would have the 
potential to produce programmatic health 
policies that would provide useful 
guidance to the humanitarian community. 
 
One example of programmatic health 
policy formulation in a chronic conflict 
recently occurred in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). 199  The process 
focused on creating a strategic health 
document that would impact on the 
enormous morbidity and mortality endured 
by the Congolese.  Historically, the DRC 
had a surprisingly robust primary health 
care system despite years of neglect and 
huge movements of internally displaced 
across the region. 200  However, the latest 
round of the war has left the health system 
in the Eastern DRC in almost total 
collapse,201 with an excess mortality of 
approximately 2.5 million people over 32 
months (from August 1998-April 2001).202  
To address the catastrophic health situation 
in the DRC, and to find ways to reduce the 
extraordinary level of mortality, UNICEF 
and WHO facilitated a meeting in Nairobi 
in September 2001.  It brought together 
health officials from rebel-controlled areas 
and the Kinshasa government for the first 
time in a decade, as well as various donors 
and NGOs working in government and 
rebel-controlled areas. A minimum 
package of services was devised that 
focused on simple methods to address the 
top seven causes of morbidity and 
mortality in the DRC, as well as a basic 
surveillance system.  The results of this 
co-ordination effort are still to be 
determined, but discussions are ongoing 
regarding financing and management 
options, and methods for further co-
ordination. 203  However, recent evidence 
suggests that the process has stalled due to 
uncertain commitment by the UN 
agencies, and difficulties in harmonizing 
the process with ongoing health policy 
formulation in Kinshasa, among other 
factors.( 9)  
 
Compared to the DRC, Somalia is more 
advanced in terms of developing an 
inclusive health policy that guides both 
donors and the humanitarian community.   
The Somali Aid Coordination Body 
(SACB) was started in 1995 and grew into 
                                                 
(9)  The Conflict and Health Program at the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine is 
currently conducting a study in the Eastern DRC to 
determine the extent to which this policy was taken 
up.    
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a Nairobi-based, institutionalised body 
funded by different donors.204  The EC 
Somalia Unit financed the position of a 
Health Sector Co-ordinator and a Health 
Co-ordination office. 
 
The precursor to the SACB was formed in 
March 1995, when four international 
NGOs met in Mogadishu to form a cholera 
task force.  By May 1995, Unicef 
concluded that co-ordination was 
important, and UNICEF and WHO asked 
the nascent “Mogadishu Health Co-
ordination group” which was later 
renamed the SACB, to host all 
organisations active in the health sector in 
Somalia.  Different working groups were 
established in order to provide technical 
assistance.  However, as there was no 
basic health policy in place in Somalia that 
provided a framework to integrate the 
outcomes of the different groups, the 
different working groups had trouble 
harmonising their results.  
 
Thus, the working groups focused on the 
development of a Minimum Package of 
Health Services for every region.  They 
also moved some of the process to Somalia 
in order to facilitate the participation of 
Somali and expatriate technical staff, and  
to ensure that the SACB was working 
towards priorities that were based on local 
needs and capabilities. The various task 
forces and working groups created 
guidelines, standards, policies and 
procedures to guide agencies and other 
service providers working in Somalia. A 
consensus building process was used 
between the international actors and the 
SACB in order to minimise any negative 
impact of interventions, and to avoid 
overlaps and duplication.  The major 
donors (EC and USAID) agreed to include 
these standards as part of their contracts 
with the implementing organisations, and 
the hope is that all donors funding 
interventions in the health sector will 
adhere to the enforcement of the 
standards.205 
To summarise, experiences in 
Mozambique, Kosovo, Afghanistan, DRC 
and Somalia show that there are many 
ways of creating health policy formulation 
processes.  Aid co-ordination mechanisms 
are useful in that they standardise practice 
between countries, and thus lessons are 
easily transferable.  However, country-
specific processes are also important 
because they focus specifically on building 
the policy process, and do so in a 
contextually specific manner.  Both types 
of mechanisms can be used in 
synchronization – for example, a SWAp 
could be conducted in co-ordination with a 
country-specific policy formulation 
mechanism, which would bring together 
the strengths of both mechanisms. 
 
 
The Limitations of Aid Co-ordination 
 
Improved aid co-ordination can only go so 
far to improving humanitarian 
effectiveness due to several systemic and 
political problems.  In order to analyse the 
effectiveness of aid co-ordination in 
promoting the health policy formulation 
process, it is instructive to examine some 
of the limitations of aid co-ordination.   
 
The first limit to aid coordination in 
complex political emergencies is that aid 
co-ordination is made much more difficult 
by the lack of a neutral political 
interlocutor.  For example, despite 
Operation Lifeline Sudan’s success in 
coordinating a humanitarian response with 
both government and rebel groups, there 
still remained major hurdles for aid 
coordination between all the actors. As a 
result of this, service provision remains 
fragmented in terms of geography and 
mode of service delivery. 206   
 
Secondly, it has been argued that a lack of 
political coherence is more problematic 
than a lack of aid coordination.  For 
example, in a February 1998 symposium 
on the relationship between humanitarian 
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action and political military action 
organized by the Belgian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, one working group 
identified the 
 
“absence of coherence among 
political institutions – donor 
governments, UN member states, 
Security Council members, 
international and regional 
intergovernmental bodies and the 
UN’s political department – as a 
more serious constraint on 
consistent and effective 
humanitarian action than problems 
among aid agencies themselves.” 
207   
 
Others argue that humanitarian aid should 
not be coherent with politics as it 
constrains humanitarian action. 208  The 
study of the Strategic Framework for 
Afghanistan (SFA)209 highlights some of 
these issues.  The SFA was part of the 
‘new humanitarianism’210 movement in the 
1990s that promoted greater coherence 
between aid and politics in an effort to 
encourage more politically informed and 
principled management of humanitarian 
resources, and the strategic application of 
humanitarian assistance to conflict 
reduction. 211  However, the SFA failed to 
enhance policy coherence because of the 
different political views held by the UN 
Special Mission to Afghanistan 
(UNSMA), other UN agencies, and 
international organisations.  UNSMA saw 
the Taliban as more of a “rogue” than a 
“failed” state, and so promoted the politics 
of isolationism, and greatly restricted 
development aid.  The remainder of the 
international community was divided on 
this issue of isolationism versus 
engagement, which was ultimately deemed 
detrimental to health service provision. 212  
The linking of humanitarian aid to political 
imperatives was seen to threaten 
humanitarian actors’ neutrality and 
impartiality, and may have compromised 
access.213  Some argued that more 
aggressive political and diplomatic 
mechanisms should have been used to 
engage the Taliban government, instead of 
relying on the humanitarian sector to 
provide political pressure.  The study 
concluded tha t lack of political coherence 
was something that could not “just be co-
ordinated away” and that further 
discussion around these issues was 
warranted.214 
 
Finally, organisations have difficulty in 
applying the lessons of aid-co-
ordination.215  The case of Rwanda 
provides a telling example whereby some 
mechanisms of the humanitarian apparatus 
were adjusted as a result of the many 
studies conducted, but the more systematic 
problems still remain.   
 
“Reforms to date have been largely 
technical, procedural, logistical and 
administrative in nature.  … Still to 
be addressed are the weak 
structures of humanitarian co-
ordination and the knotty political 
and humanitarian tensions 
underlying the intergovernmental 
system itself.”216  
 
There are many reasons for this inertia, 
many of which can be linked to constraints 
in the institutional cultures of humanitarian 
organisations: the tendency to approach 
every crisis as unique; the action-oriented 
ethos of humanitarian actors; 
defensiveness to criticism and a lack of 
accountability built into the system.  In 
order to address the constraint of 
institutional culture, some have argued that 
implementation of quality management 
models that institutionalize learning, as 
well as self- regulation rather than 
accreditation by donors are the way 
forward.217  Lack of accountability is seen 
as the most difficult to address as no single 
institution is held accountable for 
international humanitarian interventions, 
and there are no clear lines of authority, 
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reflective of co-ordination by consensus or 
default.218    
To summarise, there have been many 
developments in health policy formulation 
in complex political emergencies and post-
conflict countries.  Health policy 
formulation processes can be supported 
through various formal aid-co-ordination 
mechanisms, and through country-specific 
co-ordination mechanisms that have been 
developed explicitly to promote health 
policy processes.  There is a need to 
improve these mechanisms, and to further 
explore their role in supporting the policy 
formulation process.  Finally, the 
limitations of aid-co-ordination 
mechanisms need to be recognised when 
analysing the role of aid co-ordination in 
supporting policy formulation.  The next 
section details the need for more 
comprehensive research on the health 
policy process and its evidence-base in 
order to address some of the above issues. 
 
 
 
THE NEED FOR A RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
There is a need for more research on the 
health policy process in complex political 
emergencies and post-conflict countries.   
This is especially acute for complex 
political emergencies as there is not 
enough documented evidence to create a 
list of ‘lessons learned.’  More research on 
the technical aspects of health 
interventions in complex political 
emergencies is also required. The current 
lack of data hampers health policy 
formulation as policy-makers do not have 
enough high-quality information to make 
informed decisions.  
 
 
RESEARCH ON HEALTH POLICY 
PROCESSES  
 
More research needs to be done on the 
health policy process and the creation of 
health policy frameworks in post-conflict 
and complex political emergency settings.  
In particular, there is very little in 
documentation and analysis of experiences 
in complex political emergencies, thus 
there is little experience to draw upon.  
 
There is a growing descriptive literature on 
the subject as more and more actors start 
to document their experiences, and these 
documents increasingly find their way into 
the public domain via the internet.  
However, many of these documents 
remain difficult to find, and very few of 
them are peer-reviewed for an assessment 
of methodology, rigour and validity.   
 
The documents written so far constitute a 
body of evidence regarding “lessons 
learned” with regards to the health policy 
process.  What is needed now is to apply 
these lessons, and use operational, “real-
time” research and evaluation techniques 
to refine and document further initiatives, 
and actively stimulate discussion amongst 
health policy actors.  
 
For example, in the recent Afghanistan 
case study, recommendations were made 
for further research on specific tools and 
mechanisms that would facilitate 
organisations to take part in the policy 
process and/or provide support.219  These 
need to be taken up by humanitarian actors 
for the purposes of operational research.  
Recommendations included ‘unpacking’ 
co-ordination and creating practical 
implementation ‘checklists’ that could be 
used by policy-makers.  Such checklists 
would clearly differentiate co-ordination 
into its different components (for example 
consultation, information sharing, resource 
coordination, information management), 
and would offer guidelines on mechanisms 
to address each. 220  Another 
recommendation was to create a series of 
step-by step manuals on reconstructing key 
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needed to align and order the different components to discover 
which can be explored in parallel, which need to be priority and 
how much time might be allocated to each process. (Extracted 
from Bower 2002, Ibid) 
areas of policy in post conflict settings.  
Such manuals would be useful for policy-
makers who are often inexperienced in 
post-conflict rebuilding, and would 
facilitate transfer of knowledge from one 
post-conflict setting to another.  The 
manuals would include "a set of evidence 
and experience-based guidelines for key 
areas of policy development eg: human 
resources (which would for example 
outline options for use of incentives, ways 
to reaccredit, compulsory post-graduate 
service…), financing systems, 
decentralisation models and so on – with 
information drawn from post conflict 
settings…”221 
 
The final recommendation was to develop 
a policy ‘critical path,’ which orders policy 
decisions so that blockages to further 
progress are foreseen and addressed (see 
box below).  ‘Fast-track policies’ could be 
put in place to deal with immediate needs 
of the population and control the initial, 
rather chaotic process of rehabilitation by 
setting some ground-rules.  At the same 
time, ‘slow-track’ policies could be 
developed to address issues of health 
system reform, rebuilding, and 
sustainability.  As experience in 
Afghanistan showed, “clearly separating 
different needs and objectives for health 
policy in Afghanistan might have allowed 
for clearer, more targeted guidance to 
donors and implementing partners, thereby 
increasing the effectiveness of the advice 
as a co-ordination tool.”222   
 
Such a policy tracking tool would give 
needed guidance to policy-makers who 
may be new to the policy process.  
In complex political emergencies, 
initiatives to support the health policy 
process, and documentation of these 
initiatives are much weaker.  There is need 
for more research and  
documentation of current health policy 
processes (for example in the DRC, 
Somalia and South Sudan), and an analysis 
of the potential role of health policy in 
complex emergencies.  This information 
should be disseminated into the public 
domain, and used to provoke discussion 
amongst humanitarian actors about the role 
of health policy in complex emergencies, 
how the policy process can be stimulated 
and supported, and the pitfalls and 
opportunities of policy making in these 
volatile, fast-moving situations. 
 
 
CREATING A BETTER EVIDENCE-BASE IN 
COMPLEX POLITICAL EMERGENCIES  
 
There have been recent calls for research 
into the provision of health care in 
complex political emergencies because of 
important questions about the quality of 
health services and impact on populations,  
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223 as illustrated by questionable 
interventions in Rwanda,224 South 
Sudan225 and Ethiopia226 that may have 
contributed to morbidity and mortality.  
One recent document points out: 1) 
millions of dollars are spent on health care 
for refugees and IDPs every year; 2) these 
populations are unstable, and thus health 
actors are constantly challenged to change 
their models of health provision; 3) 
agencies face the challenge of providing 
health care and capacity building in the 
hopes of a future post-conflict transition; 
4) there are almost no evaluations of the 
effects of multiple health programs in a 
particular region, with the exception of the 
interagency Rwandese studies; and 5) 
some agencies are more developed in 
monitoring and evaluation than others and 
many are limited in terms of their capacity 
to measure the outcomes of their 
programs.227   
  
A recently completed research agenda 
outlines three main areas for research in 
complex political emergencies228: 1) 
impact of conflict on heath status/burden 
of disease; 2) response of communities, 
care providers, health services and health 
systems to conflict; and 3) the rationale, 
features and effects of internal and 
external interventions.  Questions 
particular to each of these points are 
summarised in Annex 2.  Another, more 
technical public health research agenda 
outlines questions specific to nutrition, 
reproductive and women’s health, 
communicable diseases, health services 
management, information management, 
mental health and ethics.229  These agendas 
reflect the argument that international 
relief agencies  
 
“should base their health 
intervention on objective 
epidemiological data, especially 
standardized rates of morbidity and 
mortality.  Most deaths during 
complex humanitarian emergencies 
are due to preventable causes, 
especially increased rates of 
infectious diseases malnutrition 
and violent trauma.  The most 
appropriate health interventions are 
therefore based on the models of 
public health and primary health 
care, emphasizing disease 
preventions and health 
promotion.”230 
 
Despite this, research on complex political 
emergencies remains severely limited.  
One argument against research on public 
health interventions is that “many 
approaches from evidence-based public 
health, such as the provision of food, 
potable water, and shelter are regularly 
applied during interventions.”231  
However, while there is epidemiological 
evidence that certain interventions from 
developing countries work in controlled, 
refugee-type settings, there is a lack of 
evidence for interventions for dispersed 
populations in terms of epidemiological 
data on communicable diseases, how to 
adapt basic health care interventions, and 
whether such adaptations have proved 
effective. 232  Such studies are important 
given the enormous impacts of conflict on 
populations and health systems (for 
example extremely eroded assets, targeting 
of medical staff and infrastructure, and 
limited access due to insecurity) which 
make replication of effective interventions 
much more difficult.  
 
There are numerous difficulties in 
conducting technical research in complex 
political emergencies.  One problem is 
attribution of impact to health 
interventions.  
 
“Many determinants of 
effectiveness that are part of the 
physical and organisational setting 
of humanitarian medical aid (for 
instance, political decisions, 
military action, and natural 
disasters) are extremely variable 
and unpredictable.  Not only are 
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they therefore hard to measure and 
to document thoroughly, but they 
also render problematic 
extrapolations from one context to 
another, since settings of 
interventions vary greatly. The 
sheer number of determinants of 
effectiveness (which often change 
rapidly) also makes causal 
inferences tenuous. As a result, 
accurate quantitative estimates of 
effectiveness and efficiency are 
often either not possible in 
humanitarian medical work, or 
limited in important ways.”233  
 
Other reasons often cited are problems of 
insecurity and logistics which limit 
primary data collection (although there are 
a number of independent researchers who 
have found it possible to do rigorous 
research in these settings).234  In addition, 
many agencies and international 
organisations, the UN included, lack the 
necessary evaluation and research skills.  
Finally, operational funding takes priority 
-- the tendency is for humanitarian 
agencies to act first and rarely investigate 
the effectiveness of their actions.    
 
Due to the above constraints, very limited 
funding has been allocated to pure or 
operational research in complex political 
emergencies.  However, many still believe 
that it is important to conduct more 
research on humanitarian health 
interventions in order to improve the 
effectiveness of humanitarian aid.  The 
recent introduction of industry standards as 
laid out in the Sphere Guidelines235 and the 
Humanitarian Accountability Project may 
stimulate such research as donors are 
starting to use the standards to assess 
performance.  This is seen to be both 
posit ive as standards make actors more 
accountable, as well as negative because 
the standards have a weak evidence-base 
(especially when working with dispersed 
populations), and the context of the 
situation may not allow agencies to meet 
the standards. 236  Given these recent 
developments towards accountability and 
standards, it is in the humanitarian sector’s 
interests to improve the evidence-base 
upon which these standards are based, and 
to further contextualize the use of 
standards.  Logical frameworks and 
performance evaluations can be used to 
guide such operational research.  
 
Other authors maintain that health 
interventions serve a multitude of roles, 
including protection, and that due to the 
difficulties in evaluating the 
epidemiological effectiveness of pub lic 
health interventions, effort should be 
directed instead towards documenting the 
“inequities and violations of human rights, 
as well as testifying to the resulting 
suffering.”237  Frameworks for the 
evaluation of protection have been created 
to this end.238  More discourse around this 
issue would highlight the various reasons s 
that health agencies engage in conflict, and 
how these varying mandates influence the 
research agenda.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that 
evidence is only one of the factors which 
influences policy-makers, in that policy-
makers are driven by other rationale, such 
as political imperatives and civic 
demands.239  However, the evidence-base 
regarding the effectiveness of public health 
interventions in dispersed complex 
emergency settings is particularly weak 
compared to other situations, and this, 
combined with the imperative to improve 
the effectiveness of humanitarian aid, 
should drive the research agenda forward.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Health policy frameworks have been 
important in the rebuilding and reform of 
health systems in post-conflict countries, 
such as Mozambique and Kosovo, and are 
being explored in current post-conflict 
situations, such as Afghanistan.  The 
advantages of health policy frameworks in 
post-conflict settings is that they provide a 
clear vision of how the health system 
should be rebuilt and reformed, and lead to 
detailed policy objectives and operational 
strategies.  They enable the effective 
channelling of large amounts of external 
assistance into the development of the 
health sector, and so maximise the impact 
of humanitarian aid on vulnerable 
populations.  Once a country has moved 
into the post-conflict phase, health policy 
frameworks not only aim to decrease 
morbidity and mortality, but also focus on 
building the sustainability of the health 
system.  
 
In complex emergencies, the effectiveness 
of health policy frameworks remains 
untested, although based on experiences in 
post-conflict countries, and complex 
political emergencies such as Somalia, 
such frameworks are likely prove useful to 
humanitarian agencies, which currently 
deliver services in a fragmented manner 
using different strategies and health care 
models.  Such frameworks could provide 
policy guidance, and promote a co-
ordinated approach, thus maximising the 
effect of humanitarian aid.   However, 
there are many constraints to the creation 
of such health policy frameworks in 
complex political emergencies, such as the 
questionable legitimacy and authority of 
the remaining government, harmonization 
of humanitarian aid policy with existing 
government policy, and lack of authority 
of humanitarian agencies over each other, 
amongst others.  The nature of this policy 
milieu makes it more difficult to create 
policy frameworks, and the role of health 
policy frameworks in such settings needs 
to be explored further.  
 
THE POTENTIAL OF AID CO-ORDINATION 
MECHANISMS  
 
Aid co-ordination mechanisms have been 
the major mechanisms used to create 
health policy frameworks.  SWAps, PPAs, 
CAPs and country-specific mechanisms 
such as in Somalia and the DRC all have 
the potential to support policy-making 
processes, and indeed most require that 
coherent policies are put in place.  All of 
these mechanisms need to be further 
developed, however, with a focus on the 
creation of functioning, transparent health 
policy processes.  Current review 
processes should also address some of the 
structural obstacles to aid co-ordination, 
such as the trend to earmark aid, 
discordant mandates and the politicisation 
of aid.  
 
The nature of aid co-ordination can impact 
on the creation of policy frameworks.  For 
instance, the 1994 DHA (OCHA) study of 
the Rwandan refugee crisis categorised aid 
co-ordination into three types240 – co-
ordination by command, consensus and 
default.  It concluded that co-ordination in 
complex political emergencies is generally 
by consensus or default, and that a more 
assertive model of co-ordination (i.e. 
command) is necessary for activities to be 
effective.241  A move towards more of a 
command structure may have positive 
implications for the health policy process 
as some argue that co-ordination by 
default works against the creation of 
policy frameworks presumably because 
there is lack of clear policy leadership and 
accountability. 242  However, the 
recommendation to move towards more of 
a command structure has never been acted 
on mainly because humanitarian agencies 
have limited authority and legitimacy over 
each other, the populations they work 
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with, and warring or nascent 
governments.243  The maintenance of 
organisational independence is also a 
factor. Thus the discourse continues 
regarding whether co-ordination by 
command is required and feasible, and 
which UN agency, NGO, or other 
international organisation has the capacity 
and legitimacy to take over this role. 
 
As an example, it has been suggested that 
the WHO should take a more active role in 
facilitating aid co-ordination mechanisms 
and setting national health policy 
frameworks,244 which is a shift from its 
usual role.245 246 This policy role has been 
incorporated into WHO’s Core 
Commitments in Emergencies as follows: 
(10) 
 
“Defining an integrated health 
policy for preparedness, emergency 
response and post-conflict, for a 
coherent health sector development 
resilient to emergencies, to link 
relief efforts with national 
capacities and initiate future health 
system reform.” 247 
 
A policy role is most feasible in post-
conflict settings where there is a legitimate 
interlocutor to engage with, as happened in 
Kosovo, however the WHO may also take 
a lead role in health policy formulation in 
conflict settings as illustrated by the DRC 
initiative.  
 
In order to succeed, the WHO will need to 
greatly strengthen its leadership 
capabilities in the policy process.(11)   
                                                 
(10)  Other WHO documents may need to be 
harmonised with this commitment. For example: 
WHO: Providing services and fulfilling 
responsibilities, 30 April  2001; WHO: Disaster 
preparedness and response March 2001.  And 
WHO in disaster reduction and humanitarian action 
mission brief Sept 2000.  
(11)  For example, in the DRC, while it was able to 
initiate a policy process, it was not able to carry it 
forward due to indeterminate commitment and 
staffing problems (WHO official, pers comm.). 
Suggestions for improvement include 
focusing on the policy process not 
implementation, developing skills and 
capacities in health policy analysis, 
lowering staff turnover and procuring 
funding from many different sources so as 
to be perceived as a neutral interlocutor.  
WHO also needs to develop its flexibility 
and quickness of response in terms of 
staffing, procurement and funding when 
faced with a post-conflict transition or a 
complex political emergency. 248 249   
 
There are indications that the WHO may 
be making some of these improvements 
according to recent reports on their plan 
for Iraq in case of regime change.  “…A 
humanitarian relief operation has been 
designed to meet the needs of conflict.  
Proposals to recreate and construct afresh 
health services are also well advanced.”250    
 
The above initiatives should help build 
WHO’s capacity, and therefore its 
credibility.  The problem of legitimacy(12) 
remains however, as WHO, like all UN 
organisations, has no power or authority 
over other UN agencies or international 
organisations and governments, except that 
which it wields in terms of technical 
expertise.  
 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT IN 
POLICY CHOICE 
 
When analysing the health policy process, 
it is useful to analyse the four factors 
influencing policy choice – “technical 
analysis, political stability and support, 
bureaucratic motivation, and international 
leverage,” all of which are impaired in 
                                                 
(12)  Legitimacy can be defined as authority by 
legitimacy – where the powerful actor holds an 
acknowledged right to command.  Authority can 
also be obtained through inducement (using 
positive or negative sanctions), competence 
(through expertise), and personal authority (or 
willingness to please) (Walt, Pavignani, Gilson and 
Buse 1999 Ibid).   
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complex political emergencies and post-
conflict countries due to damage sustained 
to state structures and civil society.  
 
More technical analysis of health 
interventions in complex political 
emergencies and post-conflict countries 
would provide a useful, and much needed 
evidence-base for policy makers.  Political 
stability is often weak, and political 
support needs to be gained through 
engagement of political actors into the 
policy process.  Bureaucrats in all 
organisations – international and 
government – also need to be included in 
the policy process in order to obtain their 
commitment to reform, and their input into 
it.  As one author states,  
 
“there is much to be said for 
ensuring all actors are kept up to 
speed with the process of policy 
development – the debates, the 
alternatives, the progress of 
discussions – not just decisions, not 
only to reduce the risk of 
misunderstandings circulating and 
influencing action, but also because 
the fait accompli approach closes 
off opportunity to garner expertise 
and experience.”251   
 
Finally, issues around international 
leverage and policy coherence need to be 
highlighted and  addressed by the donors 
and the wider humanitarian community in 
order to continue to learn from previous 
experience -- such as the Afghanistan 
Strategic Framework -- about the benefits 
and drawbacks of policy coherence, and 
the importance of other mechanisms 
besides humanitarian aid that can, and 
should be used to prevent and resolve 
conflict.  
 
 
A FOCUS ON HEALTH POLICY PROCESSES  
More focus and support should be given to 
the health policy process, and the 
formulation of coherent policy.  
Commitment should be given by both 
donors and implementers to being part of 
the policy process via committed staff and 
resources. To have strength of persuasion,  
it is particularly necessary that donor 
agencies are fully involved in the policy 
process to link prioritization to resource 
allocation.  The policy process -- organised 
via aid co-ordination mechanisms and/or 
country-specific policy mechanisms -- 
functions better when it is transparent, 
accountable and inclusive. Based on 
previous experience, it is helpful if lead 
policy actors have a strong mandate from 
other humanitarian actors.  Authority to 
make decisions and allocate resources are 
important when co-ordinating and setting 
health policy with a view to making it 
operational. 
 
Humanitarian agencies should further 
develop their policy analysis capabilities in 
order to better understand how context, 
process, actors and content impact on the 
policy arena.  One recommendation is to 
hire designated health policy analysts to 
drive specific policy processes forward, 
and to co-ordinate and/or create 
mechanisms for policy formulation.  In 
order to guide them,  it would be useful to 
develop policy-formulation guidelines and 
checklists via operational research and 
reviews.   
 
Finally, in post-conflict countries, it has 
been found useful to conceptualize the 
policy processes as having two tracks - a 
‘fast’ policy track that controls the 
immediate rebuilding of the country and 
meet immediate needs, and a ‘slow’ policy 
track that is focused on rebuilding the 
health system and ensuring its 
sustainability.   This concept could also be 
used by policy-makers in complex political 
emergencies, especially if there is a 
movement towards post-conflict transition, 
as occurred in Mozambique in 1992. 
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A CHANGING PARADIGM FOR HEALTH 
POLICY DEVELOPMENT?  
 
In conclusion, there seems to be growing 
consensus in the literature that the creation 
and support of health policy processes in 
post-conflict and complex political 
emergencies is important, and that it leads 
to better health service provision.  Recent 
studies on post-conflict policy initiatives 
are reassuring, as are the few documented 
experiences from complex political 
emergencies, that better health policy 
formulation leads to improved health 
outcomes in these settings.  However, 
empirical research is lacking, and needs to 
be strengthened in order to support these 
claims.   
 
As the geopolitical scenario changes to 
more of a security agenda, there will be an 
increasing focus on good governance, 
which includes policy formulation and 
implementation.  At the same time, the 
work of the Global Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health makes the 
argument that decreasing the burden of 
disease will facilitate the growth of poor 
economies.  This, combined with the 
Monterrey Consensus that decreased 
poverty may lead to decreased conflict and 
violence, leads to multiple conceptual 
reasons to improve health policy processes  
– to improve governance and to improve 
health -- both of which may lead to 
economic prosperity and decreased 
conflict in the world. 
 
As support to policy formulation is seen to 
be important both in terms of better health 
service provision and better governance, 
the humanitarian community should learn 
more about policy analysis, lend support to 
the policy process, and further investigate 
the effect of policy formulation in complex 
political emergencies and post-conflict 
countries.  
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ANNEX 1 –EIGHT COMMON LESSONS FOR POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION 
OF THE HEALTH SECTOR 
 
The following have been directly abstracted from Bower’s work,252 which are based on 
experiences from Kosovo 253 254 255 Uganda,256 Cambodia,257 Mozambique.258 259 260 
Experiences from Nicaragua,261 Ethiopia,262 Angola,263 Chad,264 Palestine265 and Liberia 
further inform these lessons.266 267 268 269 270 271 272   
 
1. Outline policy directions rapidly: It is important to develop strategic policy showing the 
broad directions of health sector development as early as possible to guide international input 
to health, and take advantage of both influxes of money and expertise and, potentially, an 
openness to change, even at the risk of narrow consultation with local actors.  
 
 
2. Differentiate different policy ‘streams’: Slowing the pace of policy response strengthens 
its content but in most post–conflict settings, producing speedy guidance in some areas, while 
not desirable, is necessary and usually inescapable. Identifying and separating out matters 
that require immediate policy guidance from those that can be developed at a slower pace 
allows effort and human resources to be more effectively focussed. 
 
 
3. Provide technical expertise in policy development : Individuals are crucial to shaping the 
policy process both because of their technical knowledge and the ability they have to relate to 
other actors. An experienced, credible and consistent team of policy developers, with 
expertise in change management and communication as well as health systems, 
organisational management and finance, is needed as early as possible.(13)  
 
 
4. Focus on health systems : Creating policy that reinstates the elements on which a 
functioning health service depends is critical. Many of the urgent health issues prevalent in 
post-conflict situations cannot be tackled in the absence of, for example, a competent and 
balanced workforce, or a performing supply system. Programme-focussed policy does not 
provide the foundation on which a health system can grow.(14) 
                                                 
(13)  Specific suggestions from the literature above include developing the capacity for policy analysis and 
strategy development in the office of every humanitarian agency. Direct resources to strengthening the 
institutional and managerial capacity of government staff. Develop methods to better understand the policy 
process, for example political mapping or stakeholder analysis. Provide support to implementing agencies in 
areas such as developing work-plans, indicators, and monitoring and evaluation systems.  
(14) Link the policy to initiatives in other sectors (for example, human resources development, finance, 
management, education etc.  Develop new techniques to prioritise health expenditures. Design the health system 
to ensure geographic and social equity as conflict results in greater inequities and social divisions. 
Consolidate and support positive initiatives and resiliencies that have occurred within the health system during a 
conflict. Include systemic policy goals and organisational principles for the health care system, as well as a 
medium-term health strategy.  Components could include: primary and secondary care, hospital services, public 
and environmental health, mental health and physical disability, reproductive health, national drug policy, health 
management, human resources development, cost recovery mechanisms, public-private mix, the role of NGOs, 
and essential infrastructure and support. Ensure sustainability for the MoH in terms of financial and human 
resources , and avoid underestimation of recurrent costs .  It is crucial that funds are allocated for the payment, 
management, and training of the civil service to avoid problems of low morale and corruption/coping strategies. 
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5. Don’t rebuild old system: analyse reality: Don’t rebuild old systems, however ‘glorious’; 
experience shows long-standing conflicts irretrievably change the environment for health 
services. Focused analysis of political, institutional, financial, cultural and human factors is 
essential to shaping policy debate and convincing co-ordination, as is investment of time and 
money in the tools (including solid, widely accessible information) and skills needed to do 
this. 
 
 
6. Ownership and consultation: genuine commitment to policy directions by national 
players is essential to successful long term implementation. Involving implementers and 
communities helps to curb unrealistic expectations. Inevitably narrow consultation in initial 
phases of strategic guidance must be compensated for by the deve lopment of policy fora 
which facilitate broad ranging debate as soon as possible.(15)  
 
 
7. Link co-ordination to resource allocation: Bodies intended to guide external 
partners/inputs must have some degree of authority over resource allocation and be linked into 
strategic policy development discussion if they are to have any impact. Even with this, co-
ordination mechanisms should aim to inspire and convince since capacity to control in post-
conflict settings is limited. 
 
 
8. Manage information proactively: Skilled gathering, collation, analysis AND 
dissemination of information removes much confusion and potential for misunderstanding 
and mistrust in a fast moving, complex situation.  
                                                 
(15) Address issues of legitimacy, power and authority in order to allow for decision making and resource 
allocation. Ensure lead policy actors have a clear mandate from other stakeholders.  Support policy 
implementation by national and local authorities.   
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ANNEX 2 – A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR COMPLEX POLITICAL EMERGENCIES 
 
 
1. Impact of conflict on health status/burden of disease 
 
· How do the causes and characteristics of conflict (cause, duration, intensity, stages of 
conflict) have differential effects on health and health systems? 
· How does disease impact affected populations, and how does conflict change the 
patterns of disease and the disease agents? 
· What are the baseline, and changing patterns of morbidity and mortality?  
 
2. Response of communities, care providers, health services and health systems to 
conflict 
 
· What is the degree of resilience and vulnerability of health systems and communities? 
How can we assess the status of communities and health systems confronted with 
crisis in order to predict to some extent how well they will cope? How and why does 
the degree of resilience/vulnerability differ between them? What successful coping 
mechanisms are adopted at the micro level that can be applied in other settings and 
translated in a macro perspective? 
· What is the ability of existing health systems to continue to perform? How could we 
identify the point of irreversible decline, beyond which conservative interventions are 
ineffective? The short- and long term results of conservative vs. radical approaches, 
introduced to sustain flagging health systems, need to be studied and understood. 
· How does the targeting of health systems / services /staff by warring parties affect 
their ability to address the health needs of the population?  What lessons have been 
learned about protecting health systems, services, and staff from being targeted in 
such environments? 
· How to identify broad secular trends, which the conflict can have magnified but not 
caused (such as brain drain, lack of production of health workers and privatisation), 
and which will persist even when the conflict is over? 
· Comparative efficiency and equity of different approaches to the rationing of health 
care at local level, given limited, inadequate and shrinking resources. 
 
3. The rationale, characteristics and effects of internal and external interventions 
 
· Given limited resources, what is the best level of care? What are the tradeoffs 
between effectiveness, efficiency, equity and sustainability of health services 
provided in conflict situations and the tradeoffs between international standards of 
care and local habits and realities? 
· How do the dynamics between stakeholders, both internal and external, influence 
health and the effectiveness of health policy and practice? Are these dynamics based 
on previous learning? How does the interplay between stakeholders evolve? What 
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strategies have been used to maintain MoH planning and policy-making capacities in 
war situations? 
· What mechanisms should be adopted to promote uniformity of treatment guidelines 
and protocols (for example for malaria and other infectious diseases) among 
humanitarian agencies providing assistance and care in a conflict or post-conflict 
environment? 
· What role does the military (occupying, peace keeping and rebel forces) play in the 
provision of effective health services? Is the risk of undermining humanitarian 
neutrality worth the benefits reaped by giving responsibilities in service provision to 
the military? 
· What is the role of traditional medical practice in the health of communities in 
conflict or crisis situations? Does traditional health care get strengthened or weakened 
in times of crisis?  What can be done to determine which elements of traditional 
practice may be health-promoting or protecting (e.g. those focused on mental health), 
while recognising that other elements may be dangerous to health (e.g. some 
traditional medicine used instead of antibiotics for STDs). 
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